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Abstract 
Objective: In order to understand the role of clergy to shape Americans’ moral worldviews, we examine whether the 
structure of clergy values varies in systematic ways according to contextual factors, such as disagreement in the 
congregation.  
Method: In early 2014 (February), clergy from a variety of Protestant denominations were contacted by email and invited 
to complete a survey online, which included a 20-item Moral Foundations (MF) battery as well as a variety of attitudinal, 
behavioral, and relational measures.  
Results: Clergy MFs resemble average citizens’, they look to preserve their autonomy by emphasizing individualizing 
foundations when they are in disagreement with their congregation, and emphasize MFs that align with their religious 
beliefs, especially their views on religious authority. 
Conclusion: We reject a special religious emphasis on binding foundations. While clergy take moral positions that reflect 
their theological commitments, we find evidence of contextualizing in how they weight moral positions.  
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Social scientists have long been interested in elite behavior – whether it is the influence of political elites on the 
general public (e.g., Clifford and Jerit 2013; Kuklinski and Hurley 1994; Zaller 1992) or clergy on parishioners (Djupe 
and Calfano 2013; Djupe and Gilbert 2009; Nteta and Wallsten 2012). Because most of this work is focused on citizen 
preferences, elite perspectives are treated as exogenous. This need not be the case as elites could rethink their views 
according to situational input and, especially, consider frames that may be more strategically efficacious. We focus our 
attention on one kind of social elite – clergy – in the context of their advancement of moral worldviews. In particular, we 
examine the structure of clergy Moral Foundations (MF), a much-replicated value schema developed by a group of social 
psychologists (Graham, Haidt, and Nosek 2009; Graham, Iyer, Nosek, Haidt, Koelva, and Ditto 2011). Moral 
Foundation theory is a useful framework for this project since it offers a range of moral understandings, it has been 
thought to connect with a wide range of religious beliefs, and it is linked to political position taking without constituting 
overt political messaging (Clifford and Jerit 2013; Clifford et al. 2015), which some clergy try to avoid. Furthermore, 
Graham and Haidt (2010) posit that the certain “binding” foundations have emerged from religious traditions 
(Authority, Loyalty and Purity), whereas the other “individualizing” foundations (Care and Fairness), that are often 
linked to liberal social attitudes, are more universally accepted. This strong expectation, consistent with a line of research 
finding a link between greater religiosity and greater conservatism across a wide range of indicators (Green et al. 1996; 
Layman 2001; Olson and Warber 2008), allows us to explore the conditions under which clergy demonstrate 
individualizing foundations. In this paper, we ask how are religious beliefs and values linked to the Moral Foundations 
and how is the religious context linked to which Foundations are prioritized? 
Following a growing line of research, we emphasize the role of the social context – the congregation and 
community. Clergy are called to minister in place, to address the needs of particular communities and operate effectively 
within the system of constraints that each community supplies. Those powerful incentives have been linked to clergy 
political behavior, the amount and shape of their political speech, and their selected reference groups. That is, contextual 
forces have been linked to the expression of clergy worldviews, but the worldviews themselves have been thought to be 
immune to such forces. It is the imperviousness of their worldviews to contextual forces that we investigate here.  
Put differently, we suspect clergy MF patterns are more complicated than simply that clergy model Moral 
Foundations that would support the religion-conservatism link – more religious conservatism linked to more binding 
foundations. One crucial step we take is to capture clergy in the social context of religion. Clergy may disagree with their 
congregations, which provides an incentive for them to emphasize autonomy through emphasis on individualism. 
Another contribution we make is to disentangle religious conservatism from religious authority, allowing for the 
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possibility of holding traditional beliefs without demanding fealty to them. Therefore, among religious conservatives, less 
robust notions of religious authority will boost the weight of individualizing foundations.  
Using an original cross-sectional dataset of clergy from a variety of Christian denominations gathered in 2014, 
we examine the patterns of Moral Foundation support among clergy. Cognizant that we cannot make causal claims, we 
test how well variance in the Foundations across these denominations is related to measures of theological conservatism, 
religious authority values, and contextual factors that may condition their emphasis on particular moral precepts.  
Why Focus on Clergy Values  
On its face, it seems obvious that clergy have a special role to play in constructing the moral worldviews of 
congregants. They are selected, in some cases assigned, to provide precisely this kind of instruction, guiding members to 
make decisions in line with moralities deeply inscribed in text and tradition (e.g., Djupe and Gilbert 2003; Guth et al. 
1997; Smidt 2016). They may have greater authority than other elites if they are afforded divine sanction for their claims 
(e.g., Grzymala-Busse 2012). And they are given deference over others at least once a week when clergy deliver sermons 
to remind congregants about the shape of that worldview and its application to specific situations. In this way, clergy 
might be thought of as the primary interpreters of the faith, shaping worldviews relevant to public decision making.  
A considerable amount of literature in the social sciences adopts this view as justification for undertaking 
studies of clergy (e.g., Guth et al. 1997; Olson 2000; Smidt 2016). This assumption is not wrong, but these claims are 
variables. Clergy are given different levels of authority, which is partly a feature of religious traditions (Djupe and Gilbert 
2009: 30-33) – it is higher among white and black evangelicals and lower among Mainline Protestants, for instance. 
Then, conditional on their level of authority, clergy may influence political and social attitudes of their congregants 
through a variety of direct and indirect mechanisms (Djupe and Gilbert 2009; Nteta and Wallsten 2012). Congregants 
may remain unaffected by overt political messaging (Djupe and Gilbert 2009; but see Bjarnasson and Welch 2004; Djupe 
and Hunt 2009; Fetzer 2001), as their disagreement conditions the effects of clergy communication through attitude 
projection, underreporting the frequency of disagreeable messages, and ignoring them altogether (Djupe and Gilbert 
2009). However, clergy still do often reference controversial issues in public settings (Brewer, Kersh, and Peterson 2003; 
Djupe and Gilbert 2003; Guth et al. 1997), though their intent is of some dispute. Some find good evidence that clergy 
are rational actors pressing a policy agenda (Calfano 2009, 2010), while others find clergy assembling public 
argumentation consonant with their congregations, which undercuts their potential for persuasion (Djupe and Neiheisel 
2008; Neiheisel and Djupe 2008).  
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Given the level of disagreement in the literature and the weak or null effects from studies of clergy persuasion 
(Djupe and Gilbert 2009; Smith 2008), perhaps the most promising avenue of clergy influence concerns the value 
systems they present that are able to bypass the defenses members erect to protect their attitudes. These value sets, such 
as those promoting inclusion versus exclusion, have been found to affect a wide range of opinions, including 
immigration, US foreign policy, and political tolerance in observational (Djupe and Mockabee 2015; Schaffer, Sokhey, 
and Djupe 2015) and experimental work (Djupe and Calfano 2013, 2015). Generally speaking, highlighting, exploring, 
and explaining religious values and moral tenets are at the core of most sermons. Moreover, this view of religious 
influence fits tightly with a long line of sociological work that finds “shared social practice is a more important 
determinant of religious conversions than specific beliefs” (Graham and Haidt 2010: 142; see also, Cavendish, Welch, 
and Leege 1998; Cornwall 1987; Welch 1981; Welch and Baltzell 1984).  
Moral Foundations 
In seeking to understand how individuals make moral decisions, psychologists have developed a pluralistic 
approach that identifies five dimensions that appear to be culturally widespread, demonstrate an “innate preparedness,” 
and are consistent with notions of evolutionary adaptive advantages (Graham et al. 2011; Graham, et al. 2013; Graham, 
Haidt, and Nosek 2009). Through dozens of studies, multiple approaches, and critical examination, five (now six) Moral 
Foundations emerged: Care/Harm, Fairness/Reciprocity, Ingroup/Loyalty, Authority/Respect, and Purity/Sanctity. The 
typical survey battery in use, available from the moralfoundations.org website, devises individual scores on these dimensions 
by summing answers across two question styles. A first set asks, “When you decide whether something is right or wrong, 
to what extent are the following considerations relevant to your thinking?”1 Examples for each dimension from this 
battery include:   
• Whether or not someone suffered emotionally (Care) 
• Whether or not some people were treated differently than others (Fairness) 
• Whether or not someone’s action showed love for his or her country (Loyalty) 
• Whether or not someone showed a lack of respect for authority (Authority) 
• Whether or not someone did something disgusting (Purity) 
 
Scoring on the dimensions are calculated by the degree of relevance that an individual rates related sets of statements 
ranging from “not at all relevant” to “extremely relevant.” A second set of questions asks about the respondent’s 
agreement with a set of statements, such as “People should not do things that are disgusting even if no one is harmed” 
(Purity) and “Compassion for those who are suffering is the most crucial virtue” (Care).   																																																								
1 A complete list of questions and the answer key can be found at www.moralfoundations.org. 
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These foundations mirror many tenets found across religions; indeed Haidt and colleagues have suggested that 
the Foundations are cultivated in religious communities and that clergy offer these themes in their sermons (Graham and 
Haidt 2010; Graham, Haidt and Nosek 2009). In the Durkheimian tradition of conceptualizing religion as a moral 
community, Graham and Haidt (2010: 140) argue that Moral Foundations theory provides a more comprehensive 
understanding of religiosity in that it moves beyond isolated, individual belief to capture the “group-focused ‘binding’ 
foundations of Ingroup/Loyalty, Authority/Respect, Purity/Sanctity.” The dimensions of Fairness and avoiding Harm 
to others are certainly important aspects of most religions, but they focus more on individual people and human rights 
whereas the other three foundations serve in “limiting autonomy and self-expression to bind people into emergent social 
entities” (Graham and Haidt 2010: 144). The Moral Foundations seem to be present in most religious groups, but this 
does not necessarily mean that each religious person draws upon each intuition equally when making moral decisions.  
In one of the few studies that examine Moral Foundations and religiosity, McAdams et al. (2008) identified left-
right differences in how highly religious, highly political people described their beliefs in open-ended questions. The 
authors coded the narratives for references to the five Moral Foundations, assigning a level of concern score on each 
dimension. Care/Harm and Fairness/Reciprocity were negatively correlated with the other three foundations, though 
they were not significantly related to each other. When the Moral Foundation scores were separately regressed on self-
reported political ideology and right-wing authoritarianism, conservatives were more likely than liberals to describe 
affinity for the community-binding intuitions (Ingroup/Loyalty, Authority/Respect, and Purity/Sanctity) whereas 
liberals demonstrated more concern for individual rights (Care/Harm and Fairness/Reciprocity) than conservatives, 
holding demographic variables constant. These findings and the negative relationship between the individual rights and 
community-binding dimensions suggest personal narratives about religious faith are linked to political ideology and the 
Moral Foundations in systematic ways (Graham, Haidt, and Nosek 2009; but see Weber and Federico 2012). The same 
pattern repeated in sermons from religious liberals and conservatives found online (Graham, Haidt, and Nosek 2009).  
It is useful to know that the central tendency of messages disseminated in liberal and conservative 
denominations differ. However, we still do not know whether these messages are generated from actual clergy 
differences in Moral Foundation support and what religious attributes are linked to holding particular Foundations. The 
key questions are: Do clergy in conservative denominations exhibit higher levels of the binding foundations than those 
in liberal denominations? Does commitment to the Foundations vary by commitment to conservative religious beliefs? 
And to what degree is commitment to the Foundations a function of the different circumstances clergy face in their 
congregations and communities? Though we cannot speak to causal ordering in cross-sectional data, we are able to 
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examine individual, congregational and community variables concurrently to better understand the religious correlates of 
clergy worldviews.  
Explaining Clergy Worldviews 
 While the need for capturing the worldviews of clergy is plain, that is not the same as explaining why they 
construct particular moral constellations. There is surprisingly little work on such a question, in part because of the 
widespread assumption that clergy, as elites, have quite well “constrained” opinions, closely connected to social 
theological underpinnings (e.g., Guth et al. 1997; Smidt 2016). Clergy with different religious backgrounds do clearly 
differ in how they think people should act in the world that plays out on multiple levels. These views differ on at least 
two dimensions, dividing clergy on the first dimension between those who see a mission of engagement with public 
matters versus those who focus on individual change (e.g., Djupe and Gilbert 2003; Guth et al. 1997; Leege and 
Trozzolo 2006; Mockabee, Wald, and Leege 2007). The other dimension concerns the ideological direction of their 
concerns, often summarized as “moral concerns” versus “social justice” (Guth et al. 1997). The two dimensions have 
never been completely orthogonal (e.g., Stark et al. 1971) and it seems as if the first dimension is collapsing onto the 
second as fewer clergy appear to remain aloof from political engagement (Djupe and Gilbert 2008; Guth 1996).  
This still begs the question of why clergy have the moral constellations that they do, and we naturally peg most 
of the influence on their religious faith – the combination of their beliefs and values. But we also perceive a potential 
tension in religious faith that reflects the tension in the Moral Foundations themselves. That is, ethics may be situational, 
and the tension between individual versus collective interests are not easy to reconcile. Indeed, clergy are called to 
minister in place, making religious messages applicable to a particular set of people and problems. Thus, we assess to 
what extent religiously conservative beliefs are linked to Moral Foundations and how the contextual logic of the 
congregation and community may help shift the construction of morality. We take these up in turn. 
Traditional measures of religious conservatism are effectively double barreled. That is, they combine belief in 
traditional Christian notions, such as the existence of heaven and hell, ordained reasons for gender roles, and the 
imminent return of Jesus, with notions of religious authority, such as the existence of one truth and the elevation of 
religious leaders. Though these two notions are related, of course, they can be disentangled in order to ask if the content 
of these beliefs are driving opinions or whether it is the form in which they held that matters most. In previous work, 
there is evidence that religious authority is the primary driver of opinions (e.g., Jelen and Wilcox 1991; Owen, Wald, and 
Hill 1991), with links to authority-mindedness, lower commitment to democratic norms, and intolerance (Burge, Djupe, 
and Lewis 2016) and democratic practice in congregations (Burge and Djupe 2015). It is straightforward to link religious 
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authority to the MF dimensions – those high in religious authority subjugate the individual to religious truths and leaders 
and hence should value the binding Foundations (Authority, Loyalty, Purity) at higher rates and individualizing at lower 
rates. Those who reject religious authority should value the individualizing Foundations (Care and Fairness) more. 
Religious conservatives who uphold religious authority follow the traditional combination – they should devalue the 
individual and empower the group. However, there are religious conservative who question religious authority – those 
who follow the emergent church and other new evangelicals – and we suspect they value the individual at higher rates.  
 The available influences on moral worldviews are not limited to belief systems, but extend to include the 
situations clergy find themselves in. Morality is one way of resolving social conflict and, given a broad toolkit, there is 
reason to believe that choice of a moral tool is made to favor the individual or ingroup (Petersen 2013). We consider two 
contexts where we might observe this taking place – the congregation and community. Despite the possibility for the 
selection of like-minded clergy, there is considerable disagreement between clergy and their congregations (Calfano 2009; 
Djupe and Gilbert 2003; Hofrenning 1995). Therefore, a reasonable expectation is that when confronted with minority 
status, individuals would augment the importance of values that preserve their autonomy – here, favoring the 
importance of Care and Fairness considerations, which preserve the rights of individuals. Since we suspect that this 
situation is most likely to be experienced by liberal clergy, it is important to control for political and religious ideology. 
But we should also examine an interaction between ideology and the experience of difference. Since liberals adhere to 
“binding” norms at lower rates, they might be unlikely to respond to homogeneity by deemphasizing the individualizing 
values they already hold dear. On the other hand, conservative clergy who perceive disagreement with the congregation 
may emphasize individualizing values at greater rates. 
Since clergy are also responsible for the success of the congregational franchise, they are often sensitive to the 
existence of disagreement among congregants (e.g., Djupe and Neiheisel 2008; Neiheisel and Djupe 2008). Here, 
heterogeneity among congregants may raise the need to emphasize individualizing notions to promote acceptance and 
social harmony among members. Congregational homogeneity, on the other hand, would weaken this need and allow 
clergy to emphasize binding norms in the congregation.  
The congregation’s interface with the community occurs on several levels. First, congregations have varying 
mixes of openness to the community that establish the basis of the religious economy (Stark and Finke 2000). All 
congregations establish some emphasis on inclusion that helps to bring in new members and emphasize exclusion to 
some degree that helps to retain members (see, e.g., Djupe and Calfano 2013, 2015). It is straightforward to expect that 
those with an inclusive orientation, which explicitly acknowledges openness in the face of disagreement, would value 
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individualizing norms, while an exclusive orientation would be linked to a higher binding commitment. Behavioral 
representations of openness should display the same tendencies. That is, church outreach activities to find new members 
should be linked to great individualizing norms. It is not clear how outreach, in and of itself, should be linking to 
binding, given that outreach may concern accepting people for who they are or changing them to fit a prescribed model. 
That tension suggests that we should examine an interaction between religious authority and outreach. 
Data and Design 
To explore these notions, we gathered a sample of clergy from several Protestant Christian groups, including 
the Presbyterian Church USA (PCUSA), the Southern Baptist Convention (SBC), the United Methodist Church (UMC), 
the Greek Orthodox Church, (GO) and the Reformed Church in America (RCA).2 This set includes a variety of 
American Christianity, though is obviously not a random sample, and groups were picked to capture variation across the 
religious and political spectrum.3 The advantage is that, so far, there are no samples of clergy, national, communal, or 
denominational, that include detailed questions about their Moral Foundations. The sample does include a wide variety 
of theological traditions and thus it will be surprising to note the degree of uniformity across these religious groups in 
key variables. Still, caution should be exercised with extending any of the descriptive evidence presented below to the 
population of clergy. We employed a variety of measures to test the nature and correlates of the Moral Foundations for 
our participants; some are detailed below, and the rest are available in the online Appendix.4 
Moral Foundations. A 20-item questionnaire was used to measure an individual’s Moral Foundations’ scores 
(www.moralfoundations.org). As noted above, for the first set of items, participants were asked to rate statements from 
“not at all relevant” (1) to “extremely relevant” (5). Two statements are tied to each of the five Moral Foundations, as 
indicated in the online Appendix. This set also included an item, which tested for attention and full use of the scale: 																																																								
2 In February, 2014, we emailed 16,740 survey invitations. Clergy were contacted to participate via their listed office 
email address. For the smaller denominations in our study – the Greek Orthodox and RCA – addresses were culled from 
publicly-available parish and denominational websites that listed this individual-level contact information. PCUSA clergy 
contact information was provided to the authors from the denomination’s in-house research office. For the largest 
denominations in our study – the UMC and SBC – we relied on a commercially-generated email list from the vendor 
Exact Data, which maintains current congregational lists for a variety of US denominations. Each of the culling methods 
has drawbacks from the standpoint of representativeness, although it is not possible to determine exact sampling biases a 
priori. In each denominational case, we endeavored to use the total population of clergy with listed email addresses, 
which is a subset of the total clergy population in each denomination. Three reminders were sent and the survey closed 4 
weeks later. The sample consists of 456 respondent clergy. The sample is 94% white and 18% female – while surely 
unrepresentative of all American clergy, it is representative of the clergy from these denominations. Our denominational 
breakdown was as follows: 48% PCUSA, 26% RCA, 12% SBC, 8% UMC, and 6% GO. 
3 The religious conservatism measure from our data has a mean of 3.6 (sd=1.1), which is close to the scale midpoint. 
That is, the distribution of religious conservatism in our data is relatively flat. Our data are also symmetrically distributed 
in terms of partisanship (45 percent each Democrats and Republicans), which is to say that there is considerable diversity 
in our sample. 
4 The Appendix is available here: http://pauldjupe.com/s/FD_Appendix.docx 
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“Whether or not someone was good at math.”5  The second set of questions provided a list of statements with which 
participants were asked to indicate their degree of agreement – “strongly disagree” (1) to “strongly agree” (5), as well as 
an attention check – “It is better to do good than to do bad” – and individuals who slightly disagreed through strongly 
disagreed were dropped (this snared very few participants). 
Results 
Because the early evidence about the Moral Foundations of clergy in sermons suggested differences by 
denomination (Graham, Haidt and Nosek 2009), we were interested in first depicting our data in this manner. Figure 1 
displays the average level of agreement with and variation in each of the five Foundations by denominational affiliation. 
In support of the literature, those in denominations that tend more theologically left scored slightly higher on the 
individualizing Foundations than their theologically conservative counterparts. For instance, PC(USA) clergy rate Care 
considerations higher than SBC clergy, but while those two are significantly different from each other, the rest are not. 
The differences reversed for the binding Foundations, as those on the theological right scored significantly higher than 
the others on Authority, Loyalty and Purity, with Greek Orthodox clergy demonstrating similar binding Foundation 
preferences to SBC clergy and PC(USA) clergy showing the least concern for the binding considerations. These findings 
suggest that Graham, Haidt, and Nosek’s (2009) sermon content results may be driven by actual differences in 
individual-level clergy values, but there is quite wide variation within denominations. We will explore this in more detail 
in a multivariate analysis below. 
[Figure 1 about here] 
One argument for the association between Moral Foundations and political and religious beliefs is that the 
Foundations are capturing a latent trait of general conservatism (cite omitted for review; but see Smith et al. 
forthcoming). Specifically, Haidt (2012) suggests that differing levels of the binding foundations reflect religious beliefs 
along a liberal-conservative continuum. Whether the cause is clergy self-selection into more conservative or progressive 
congregations, an uptake of that denomination’s beliefs once the clergy is affiliated, or a combination of both that 
creates a reinforcement effect, we expect a relationship between the binding foundations and religious conservatism 
(based on a set of 6 beliefs reflecting a more literal view of the Bible). Figure 2 displays the relationship of religious 
conservatism with binding and individualizing Foundations. As expected, theological conservatism is positively 
associated with the binding Foundations and negatively associated with the individualizing ones. Whether conservative 																																																								
5 Ninety-two percent replied that the math consideration was “not at all relevant.” Ninety-eight percent agreed that it is 
better to do good than to do bad. The results shift very slightly when those few who failed these attention checks were 
excluded, but the substantive interpretation of variables maintains the same.   
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religious beliefs cause clergy to rely more upon Authority, Loyalty, and Purity than their more progressive peers or the 
reverse, there is a clear connection between these two domains. At the same time, it is clear that there is considerable 
variation left to explain at each level of religious conservatism.  
[Figure 2 about here] 
Drawing on recent research (Burge, Djupe, and Lewis 2016), we argued earlier that religious conservatism is 
double-barreled, including belief in traditional Christian ideas as well as commitment to the authority of those ideas. This 
survey included measures appropriate to capture variation in commitment to religious authority, which others have 
found are linked to identity in and support for the emergent church movement (Burge and Djupe 2016). The measures 
include agreement that there are many valid interpretations of the Bible, that congregations should construct their own 
salvation, and that clergy lead best by stepping out of the way (see the online Appendix for full variable coding). The link 
of this index to individualizing and binding norms is shown in the bottom panels of Figure 2. They show the same 
association as religious conservatism – emphasis on religious authority (disagreement with the statements listed above) is 
linked to a de-emphasis on individualizing and a greater emphasis on the binding Foundations. The relationships are 
quite similar in strength – the religious authority effect is a bit stronger for the individualizing Foundations, while 
religious conservatism has a stronger link to the binding Foundations. The consistency in bivariate relationships merely 
begs the question of whether the ideas or the way in which they are held matter more for the emphasis on individual 
versus binding Foundations.  
We have developed a bivariate picture of how clergy MFs relate to important religious measures, which serves 
to reinforce extant notions taken from other data, such as sermon content. The next step is to combine these measures 
with others to better understand what constitutes the mix of clergy Foundations. Our focus will remain on whether 
these bivariate relationships hold in the presence of controls, but will also extend our look to see if the effects of 
religious beliefs and values shift depending on the context.  
Model Results 
Figure 3 displays the results of the individualizing and binding Foundations regressed on religious, contextual, 
and demographic variables (the coefficients are available in the online Appendix in Table A.1). Each variable has been 
transformed to run from 0-1 so that the marginal effects shown in Figure 3 represent the full effect of each independent 
variable. 
[Figure 3 about here] 
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The results highlight the worth of separating out religious authority from religious conservatism. Religious 
authority has a quite large effect, serving to weaken support for the individualizing Foundations. Since authority is about 
submitting to religious ideas and leaders, this result is no surprise. Once authority is controlled, religious conservatism 
has no effect on individualizing, but it is significantly linked to the binding Foundations – this is the now traditional 
pattern. However, in results shown in Figure A1 in the online Appendix, there is an interaction between these two 
variables that shows heretofore hidden variation in individualizing. Religious liberals value the individualizing 
Foundations at high rates regardless of their expressed value of religious authority. Only religious conservatives 
differentiate in the individualizing Foundations based on their religious authority levels. They are less supportive the 
more authority they adopt. So, who are the religious conservatives who reject religious authority? They might be called 
new evangelicals – in our data they support the “emergent church” and feel more positive toward, for instance, illegal 
immigrants. It makes sense, then, that new evangelical issue agendas include immigration, sex trafficking, and climate 
change that focus on individual rights (Pally 2011). There is no interaction between them on binding – the differences 
between liberals and conservatives are consistent across authority levels. That is telling since liberals consistently support 
binding Foundations at lower levels; hence most of the interesting variance in clergy Moral Foundations is in their 
support for individualizing Foundations.  
Remaining closely connected to other church members (exclusive values) is linked to greater support for 
binding Foundations, while reaching out to diverse others (inclusive values) is linked to greater individualizing. These are 
the effects of values that demand action. Thus, it is instructive to observe what happens to support for the 
individualizing Foundations when churches actually reach out to new members.6 The interaction between exclusive 
values and church outreach is shown in Figure 4. The most committed to exclusivity actually are more supportive of 
individualizing Foundations as their church outreach to new members grows. The opposite occurs among the least 
exclusive – their emphasis on individualizing drops considerably (by 13 percent) the more outreach their church engages 
in. Recruiting new members requires some balance of welcoming and accepting new people while preserving what was 
valuable about the church culture. This is why Stark and Finke (2000) suggest that the balance of inclusion and exclusion 
drives the religious economy.  
[Figure 4 about here] 
The homogeneity of congregants bears on both Moral Foundations. The most homogeneous congregations 
have clergy who are 10-15 percent less committed to both individualizing and binding Foundations. If the Foundations 																																																								
6 The relationship between exclusive value holding and church outreach is positive and significant – r=.13, p=.02. 
	 12	
are cultural strategies to navigate social differences, then the absence of problems caused by difference would entail less 
clear need for these tools.  
Clergy drop their commitment to binding Foundations when faced with disagreement with their congregation.7 
The effect is small, but significant and suggests that clergy deemphasize Foundations that would inhibit their autonomy. 
That interpretation is bolstered on the other side. While the sample-level effect is indistinguishable from zero, 
disagreement with the congregation has different effects on individualizing for conservatives than liberals (here 
Republicans versus other partisans8). As shown in Figure 5, Republicans raise their support for individualizing when 
faced with greater disagreement with the congregation, while liberals (technically, non-Republicans) maintain a consistent 
level of support for individualizing Foundations in the face of disagreement. We believe the interpretation is the same as 
above – clergy place greater weight on moral considerations that preserve their freedom to advocate. Since Republican 
clergy also face somewhat less disagreement in their congregations (.26 versus .41 for others on a 0-1 scale), this is one 
important explanation why Republican clergy evince less support for the “liberal” individualizing Foundations.  
[Figure 5 about here] 
The similarity of the church to the community has no direct effect on clergy’s Moral Foundations, but that is 
because that status interacts with their values. In particular, we find that inclusivity interacts with community similarity. 
As shown in Figure 6, the most inclusive clergy are committed to individualizing Foundations at high rates no matter 
how they compare to the community. The least inclusive, on the other hand, react to community similarity in ways 
consistent with their values. That is, the value of individuals is greater when they are similar to the community and 
becomes more threatening to the group (and hence are devalued) when they are dissimilar. 
[Figure 6 about here] 
 Perhaps surprisingly, there are no gender differences on the Foundations when controlling for all other 
variables. Years in the ministry is associated with higher scores on all the Foundations, perhaps as clergy find their voice 
and engage with larger congregations in which more moral strategies are needed. As evidenced by Figure 1, significant 
denominational effects are not present in the binding Foundations but Greek Orthodox, UMC, and PCUSA clergy are 																																																								
7 Given the possibility that these results are driven by religious liberals who value the binding Foundations at lower 
levels, we also re-estimated these results using data pre-processed with coarsened exact matching. The result holds. 
Please see the online Appendix (pp. 7-8) for further discussion. 
8 For some reason, this survey did not ask the standard ideology question, so partisanship is a necessarily imperfect 
proxy. By 2014, Americans are well sorted on these measures. But we also have access to clergy data from the 2009 
Cooperative Clergy Study, which included 10 Christian denominations. The correlation between the traditional ideology 
and partisanship measures is r=.83. It is r=.8 when using the denominations that overlap the two studies (the UMC, 
SBC, and RCA).  
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more likely to score higher on the individualizing Foundations than their SBC counterparts (the excluded reference), 
even when controlling for the other variables. 
Discussion 
 When controlling for other individual-level and contextual variables, the relationship between denominational 
affiliation and the binding Foundations fades – none are distinguishable. So, if religious communities are important for 
developing the particular moral understandings of their members, then these data suggest those communities are not 
tightly organized under denominational labels. Instead, the variation across religious organizational leadership is best 
characterized by their religious conservatism and authority for which denominations are noisy proxies. Clergy resemble 
rank-and-file Christians (McAdams et al. 2008) in that religious conservatism and exclusive values predict higher levels of 
the binding Foundations. References to these Foundations may find their way into sermons, institutional decisions, and 
ministry opportunities that highlight boundaries with the world. In this way, clergy may avoid controversial overt 
political statements but still convey conservative values to their constituents. If understood generally as a message 
promoting exclusion, then research supports the link to conservative positions against, for instance, immigration and for 
interventionist foreign policy (see Djupe and Calfano 2013). 
Though denominational affiliation does not distinguish the binding Foundations of the clergy in our sample, 
there are some affiliation effects on the individualizing Foundations. For example, Southern Baptist Convention clergy 
place less value on the individualizing Foundations than their Greek Orthodox (p=.04) and PCUSA (p=.00) peers – and 
the comparison with United Methodists is nearly distinguishable (p=.14) even after controlling for religious conservatism 
and authority. Referring back to Figure 1, much of this effect appears to be driven by low SBC scores on Care. The Care 
questions in our sample include making moral decisions based on whether someone “suffered emotionally” or whether 
an animal was harmed, areas where SBC clergy may demonstrate less concern than, say, indicating that compassion “is 
the most crucial virtue.” We tested each of the Care items separately. SBC clergy were still more likely to score lower on 
each of these when compared to clergy from the other denominations but the largest differences were, as expected, with 
the animal harm and emotional suffering items. This supports the extant findings about the association between the 
individualizing foundations and liberal views and demonstrates that conservative clergy may speak less about Care/Harm 
themes in their sermons (Graham, Haidt, and Nosek 2009). Since religious conservatism is unrelated to Fairness or Care, 
the denominational difference points to the importance of authority – those who emphasize religious authority devalue 
the individualizing Foundations considerably. It is only the conflation of authority and conservatism that makes 
conservatives look like they value individualizing. It is still possible to possess religiously conservative beliefs and have a 
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high concern for individual rights, which can be seen in numerous issue areas (see Djupe, Lewis, Jelen, and Dahan 2014; 
Lewis 2014), but especially now in appeals to reinforce religious liberty.  
 Our findings also shed further light on the conditions under which religious institutions and their leaders may 
be teachers of the Foundations that “bind” communities together (Graham and Haidt 2010). Higher scores on the 
binding Foundations are negatively related to similarity among congregants, indicating there is more concern for binding 
values when faced with diverse pews. Of course, we cannot speak to causal ordering – whether clergy low in the binding 
Foundations seek out homogeneous churches or whether homogeneity undercuts the need to develop a worldview 
supportive of binding. But homogeneity is also negatively associated with the individualizing Foundations, which places 
emphasis on the latter interpretation: the Foundations are tools marshalled to address social problems. Homogeneous 
societies are simply less prone to problems that moral logics are drawn on to solve. Hence, diverse societies might be 
seen as stimulants to moral development.   
Conclusion 
 Though our study is not without its limitations, it is the first of its kind to examine the Moral Foundations of 
American clergy. Our findings speak to the context and content of possible clergy influence, suggesting that religious 
values interact with congregational, community, and individual-level variables to shape clergy moral worldviews. Graham 
and Haidt (2010) tend to emphasize the role of religious institutions in cultivating the binding Foundations. Our sample, 
however, shows clergy resembling average people, demonstrating considerable variance in binding and more consistent 
emphasis on the individualizing Foundations across denominations – strong majorities of every denomination’s clergy in 
this sample place more emphasis on the individualizing Foundations save the SBC where 47 percent value them more.9  
The binding Moral Foundations that promote self-control as a way of organizing group life may work for some 
clergy in some congregations, but others may find themselves leaning toward a promotion of Care and Fairness to bring 
the congregation together through selfless beliefs and behaviors on behalf of others. This is where we see the tension 
between the literature on clergy influence, our findings, and how Haidt and colleagues understand the religious origins of 
Moral Foundations. Liberal clergy and those who reject religious authority may not need to endorse or advocate the 
binding Foundations in order to create cohesive or effective moral communities.  
We offer some evidence that clergy may adapt their worldviews to their contexts, which quite likely shapes the 
messages they send to congregants. Moral worldviews are answers to questions about how to organize society and hold 																																																								
9 The percent of clergy in each denomination that values individualizing over binding is: 67% for the Greek Orthodox, 
91% of the UMC, 68% of the RCA, and 90% of the PC(USA).  
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it together, about how to weigh the autonomy of individuals. Clergy may value the individualizing Foundations more 
when those moral arguments are needed to support their own autonomy, but they appear to be quite sensitive to the 
optimal moral structure that would accommodate growing congregations and diversity in the pews. That is, Moral 
Foundations might be usefully thought of as a reasonably flexible set of tools that help clergy minister to a particular 
congregation set in a community with particular needs. That interpretation begs the question of just how foundational 
the Foundations are. Asking that question is consistent with emerging research that shows instability across time (Smith 
et al. 2016) and generations (citation omitted for review). Of course, only longitudinal research of clergy across 
congregations can reveal whether clergy do truly adapt to new circumstances through a shift in their moral worldviews 
or attempt to self-select contexts congenial to their preferred moral approach. 
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Figure 1 – Moral Foundations Support by Denomination  
 
Note: The gray capped lines represent 2 standard deviations around the mean; the black spike represents 95% 
confidence intervals for the mean. G=Greek Orthodox, S=Southern Baptist Convention, M=United Methodist Church, 
R=Reformed Church in America, and P=Presbyterian Church (USA)   
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Figure 2 – The Link between Religious Orientations and the Binding and Individualizing Moral Foundations 
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Figure 3 – OLS Regression Estimates of the Individualizing and Binding Moral Foundations 
 
Note: 90% confidence intervals.  
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Figure 4 – Interactive Effects of Church Outreach Activities and Exclusive Values on Individualizing Foundations 
 
Note: 90% confidence intervals. 
  
.4
5
.5
.5
5
.6
.6
5
.7
In
di
vi
du
al
iz
in
g
0 .1 .2 .3 .4 .5 .6 .7 .8 .9 1
Member outreach
Least Exclusive Most Exclusive
	 24	
 
Figure 5 – Differential Effects of Congregational-Clergy Disagreement on Individualizing Norms Among Partisans 
 
Note: 90% confidence intervals. 
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Figure 6 – Interactive Effects of Church-Community Differences and Inclusive Values on Individualizing Foundations 
 
Note: 90% confidence intervals. 
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